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Introduction 
Titles II-V and Title IX of Part III of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the 
EU and UK (TCA) govern police cooperation and the exchange of information. They 
are of critical importance in maintaining an adequate level of interaction between the 
EU and UK criminal justice authorities including the sharing of information in the fight 
against crime. As expected, the high level and intricate nature of cooperation between 
EU Member States was lost to the UK. Its maintenance was impossible. Several is-
sues stood in its way, not least of which was the role of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU). That noted, a somewhat reassuring degree of cooperation 
and information subsists under the TCA, particularly in the light of the spectre of a no-
deal Brexit. 
Five distinct subject areas within police cooperation and the exchange of information 
are covered by Part III and the relevant Annexes thereto of the TCA.2 These replace 
certain of the features giving effect to the EU’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
as defined by Title V of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).3 
The areas included are those which the UK chose to participate in spite of its general 
opt-out to Title V. Namely, the exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration 
data, the transfer and processing of passenger name record data, cooperation on op-
erational information, membership of Europol and the exchange of criminal record in-
formation. These reflect the subject matter hitherto addressed by Prum Decisions4, 
                                                          
1 Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the European Union and the European Atomic Energy 
Community, of the one part, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, of the 
other Part, [2020] OJ L 444/14, available at <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2020.444.01.0014.01.ENG> accessed 23 January 2021 (TCA). 
All provisions cited in this piece without further reference belong to the TCA.  
2 The exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration data (Title II) with Annex Law-1, the 
transfer and processing of passenger name record data (Title III) with Annex Law-2, the cooperation 
on operational information (Title IV), the cooperation with Europol (Title V) with Annex Law-3, and 
the exchange of criminal record information (Title IX) with Annex Law-6. 
3 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/47. 
4 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime [2008] OJ L 210/1; Council Decision 
2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping 
up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime [2008] 
OJ L 210/12. 
Passenger Name Records (PNR)5, the Schengen Information System II (SIS II)6, the 
Europol Regulation7 and European Criminal Records Information System (ECRIS)8 
respectively. The measures in Part III operate from the point at which the transition 
period ended, 23.01 GMT on 31 December 2020.  
It is generally accepted that the ideal position post-Brexit from a police cooperation 
and exchange of information perspective was the status quo ante. It was not possible 
for the UK to continue to access databases in the same way it had as a Member State 
however and consequently there are now new provisions applying, and in certain im-
portant respects the substance of those rules has changed. However, it is also correct 
to state that overall the TCA maintains a high level of consistency with past arrange-
ments. The TCA arguably represents the best result that could have been achieved in 
the circumstances, particularly in view of the ’red-lines’ imposed by both sides.  
Overview 
Criminal cooperation within the EU is multi-faceted and inter-linked. To take a straight-
forward example, the sharing of arrest warrant information under SIS II is closely linked 
to the operation of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). Without the former the latter 
would be materially less efficient and effective. The danger in the area of police coop-
eration and information exchange is that changes in one area will negatively impact 
upon another. Sadly, this has to an extent happened – as will be mentioned below.  
More generally, individual criminal justice measures relate to more than the overall 
system of criminal justice cooperation. Those measures are also part of and affected 
by wider underlying rules and issues within and outside EU law. Notable here are 
human rights obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights of 1950 
(ECHR)9, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (CFREU),10 the EU’s General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)11 and the jurisdiction of the CJEU. In this vein the 
                                                          
5 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2016/681 of 27 April 2016 on the use of passenger 
name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime [2016] OJ L 119/132 (PNR-Directive). 
6 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the 
second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) [2007] OJ L 205/63 (Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA). 
7 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2016/794/2016EU of 11 May 2016 the European 
Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation 
(Europol) and replacing and repealing Council Decisions 2009/371/JHA, 2009/934/JHA, 
2009/935/JHA, 2009/936/JHA and 2009/968/JHA [2016] OJ L 135/114 (Europol Regulation). 
8 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal 
Records Information Systems (ECRIS) in application of Art 11 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA 
[2009] OJ L 93/33 – will be replaced on 28 June 2022 by Directive (EU) 2019/884. 
9 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms [ECHR], CoE [1950] 
European Treaty Series – No. 005 (ECHR). 
10 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C 326/391. 
11 European Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 679/2016 of 27 April 2016 on the protection of 
natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation) [2016] OJ L 119/1. 
UK has conceded that continued adherence to the ECHR and the treaty’s direct effect 
in domestic law are preconditions for cooperation, and has agreed to a high level of 
protection of personal data. These obligations are found in Art LAW.GEN.3 and 4 of 
Part III, Title I12. For its part, the EU has accepted a bespoke dispute resolution mech-
anism, in place of CJEU oversight.13 A Specialised Committee will be created that has 
the power to resolve disputes. The jurisdiction of the Committee includes the subject 
matter of Part III of the TCA.14  
Title II – DNA, Fingerprints and Vehicle Registration 
Applicable Law 
Governing the automated exchange of DNA, fingerprints and vehicle registration is 
Title II, Art LAW.PRUM.5-19. Aspects of this cooperation were hitherto governed by 
the Prum Decisions, they being Council Decision 2008/615/JHA15 and Council Deci-
sion 2008/616/JHA16. These lay down provisions under which EU Member States 
grant access to their automated DNA analysis files, fingerprint identification systems 
and vehicle registration data. The operative provisions within the Prum Decisions are 
generally reflected in the TCA. For example, Art 2, 3, and 4 Council Decision 
2008/615/JHA on the establishment of national DNA analysis files, automated search-
ing and automated comparison are similar to Art LAW.PRUM.7, 8, and 9. The TCA 
somewhat similarly provides for fingerprint identification and vehicle registration data. 
Of note is Art LAW.PRUM.17(1), which obliges the UK and Member States to make 
all categories of data available for search and comparison to the competent law en-
forcement agencies of other states on a similar basis to that applying to their domestic 
authorities. The declaration made by Member States under the Prum Decisions shall 
apply in their relations with the UK. Art LAW.PRUM.18 conditions the application of 
the operative part of Title II upon an ‘evaluation visit and a pilot run’ in order to verify 
whether the UK has fulfilled the conditions in Art LAW.PRUM.17. Art 
LAW.PRUM.18(3) provides that data may be transferred for a period of up to nine 
months pending the evaluation. ANNEX LAW-1 EXCHANGES OF DNA, 
FINGERPRINTS AND VEHICLE REGISTRATION DATA sets out data protection, ad-
ministrative and technical provisions for the implementation of Title II. 
Preliminary Analysis 
Title II of the TCA provides that the UK can continue to be involved in the transfer of 
DNA data, fingerprint information and of vehicle registration data with EU Member 
                                                          
12 All provisions cited in this piece without further reference belong to the TCA. 
13 See Oehmichen, Schomburg and Kayß, in this issue. 
14 Art INST.10 2(f) of Part IV. For further details, see S. Schomburg, in this issue. 
15 Council Decision 2008/615/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, 
particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border crime [2008] OJ L 210/1. 
16 Council Decision 2008/616/JHA of 23 June 2008 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA 
on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and cross-border 
crime [2008] OJ L 210/12. 
States. The extent of the operational impact to police work and police cooperation is 
yet unclear. The ‘evaluation visit and pilot run’ provides the basis for the determination 
of the date or dates from which personal data may be supplied by Member States to 
the UK under Title II.17 It is possible, therefore, that the evaluation report is such that 
the date for cooperation to commence is delayed (the nine-month grace period noted). 
More particularly, certain of the bespoke arrangements within the TCA of course re-
main to be tested operationally. For example, as to vehicle registration data ANNEX 
LAW-1 Art 14 provides that for automated searching of vehicle registration data ‘… 
States shall use a version of the European Vehicle and Driving Licence Information 
System (EUCARIS) software application, especially designed for the purposes of Art 
LAW.PRUM.15’. It is not certain, of course, how well this new software system will 
operate. Overall, then, in general terms this area of police cooperation and information 
exchange under the TCA is set to be relatively similar to that operating previously, in 
law and for initial nine-month period in any event. Operationally, the nature of cooper-
ation and information exchange remains to be seen. 
Title III – Passenger Name Records 
Applicable Law 
Art LAW.PNR.18-38 govern the transfer of passenger name records (PNR) between 
the EU and the UK. In general terms, the UK and EU are granted access to PNR of 
flights departing the territories of each other, and as regards air carriers incorporated 
within the EU or storing data there.18 The central operative provision is Art 
LAW.PNR.22. It inter alia provides, the UK ‘… shall share with Europol or Eurojust, 
within the scope of their respective mandates, or with the PIUs (Passenger Information 
Units) of the Member States all relevant and appropriate analytical information con-
taining PNR data as soon as possible in specific cases…’.19 The reciprocal obligation 
on the EU is to be found in Art LAW.PNR.22(3). In both cases access is permissible 
only for the purposes of preventing, detecting, investigating, or prosecuting terrorism 
or serious crime20, subject to safeguards on the use and storage of the information.21  
More specifically, many of the operative terms in Title III mirror those found in the PNR-
Directive.22 For example, the definition of a “passenger name record” in Art 
                                                          
17 Art LAW.PRUM.18(2). 
18 Art LAW.PNR.18. 
19 Art LAW.PNR.22(1). 
20 As defined in ANNEX LAW-7 Art 3-14. ANNEX Law-7 provides definitions of terrorist groups (art 
2), terrorist offences (Art 3), offences related to terrorist groups (Art 4), public provocation (Art 5), 
recruitment (Art 6), providing (Art 7) and receiving (Art 8) training, travelling for the purpose of 
terrorism (Art 9) or organising resp. facilitating that (Art 10), financing terrorism (Art 11) or other-
wise committing offences related to terrorism (Art 12). Provisions on relationships, aiding, abetting, 
inciting and attempting are included in Art 13, 14.  
21 Art LAW.PNR.20(1). 
22 European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2016/681 of 27 April 2016 on the use of passen-
ger name record (PNR) data for the prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution of terrorist 
offences and serious crime [2016] OJ L 119/132 (PNR-Directive). 
LAW.PNR.19 is a verbatim repetition of that found in Art 3(5) PNR-Directive. The TCA 
sets out in ANNEX LAW-2 the 19 separate elements of such data such as the PNR 
record locator, date of reservation, name, address, telephone number of passenger, 
payment and billing information etc. These are the same as those in Annex 1 of the 
PNR-Directive. The purposes for which PNR data can be used are the same in both 
the TCA and PNR-Directive, although the phraseology differs. Governing the transfer 
of PNR data in UK law is the Passenger Name Record Data and Miscellaneous 
Amendments Regulations 2018.23 As a result of the TCA these regulations were 
amended. This was affected by section 7 of the European Union (Future Relationship) 
Act 2020. That provision states that the amendments to the regulations are made by 
Schedule 2 to the Act. It also provides for a transitional period. 
Preliminary Analysis 
The rules and regime applying to PNR data exchange between the EU and UK have 
generally remained the same. There are not-insignificant exceptions to this, however. 
One difference is that the UK and EU may well in fact benefit from the UK’s new status 
through an increase in the amount of PNR data accessible to them by virtue, of the 
UK being a third country outside the EU. This is because the PNR-Directive provided 
that the sharing of PNR data as regards intra-EU flights was optional.24 Under the 
TCA, as seen, the obligation in Art LAW.PNR.22 is mandatory (subject to various safe-
guards). A further change relates to the deletion of PNR data upon departure from the 
UK (with certain exceptions). This is required by Art LAW.PNR.28(4). This obligation 
was not found in the PNR-Directive. Reflecting this change there is provision for tem-
porary oversight of the operation of the TCA whilst the UK makes changes in its PNR 
processing systems in pursuance of this new obligation.25 
Apart from the TCA but of note generally is that the UK has amended the Passenger 
Name Record Data and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018 to include the 
possibility of a PNR mechanism applying to rail and sea travel. It provides that if an 
agreement on such is concluded between the EU or one or more of its Member States 
then the UK Secretary of State can make an appropriate implementing provision. Nei-
ther the PNR-Directive nor the TCA mention rail or sea travel. Finally, it must be noted 
that the as yet unresolved question of data adequacy is important to the operation of 
Title III, as it is with Part III as a whole. As is discussed below and further in this issue26, 
continued PNR cooperation hinges upon that critical question.27  
                                                          
23 The Passenger Name Record Data and Miscellaneous Amendments Regulations 2018, SI 
2018/598. 
24 Art. 2 PNR-Directive. 
25 Art LAW.PNR.28(10) and (11). 
26 See Van de Heyning, in this issue. 
27 See Clowance Wheeler-Ozanne, ‘Deal or no Deal: Does it Matter? Data Protection Predictions for 
post-Brexit Britain’ [2020] 24 Edin. LR 275. 
Title IV – Operational Information 
Applicable Law 
Art LAW.OPCO.1 governs cooperation on operational information. The objective is to 
ensure that competent authorities can, subject to the conditions of their domestic law, 
assist each other through the exchange of relevant information ‘for the purposes of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences; execution of 
criminal penalties; safeguarding against, and prevention of, threats to public safety; 
and the prevention and combating of money laundering and the financing of terror-
ism.’28 Art LAW.OPCO.1(3) confirms that ‘information, including information on wanted 
and missing persons as well as objects, may be requested by a competent authority 
of the United Kingdom or of a Member State, or provided spontaneously to a compe-
tent authority of the United Kingdom or of a Member State.’ Importantly, information 
can be provided spontaneously as well as in response to a request, but this is subject 
to the conditions of the domestic law as set out in Art LAW.OPCO.1(3)-1(4). In urgent 
cases Art LAW.OPCO.1(5) requires requests be responded to as soon as possible. 
Art LAW.OPCO.1(6) sets out that consent is needed to use information for evidential 
purposes in proceedings before a judicial authority. Consent may be subject to the 
conditions in Title VIII29 and the conditions of the domestic law in the providing State. 
If consent is not given the information shall not be used for evidential purposes in 
proceedings before a judicial authority. Art LAW.OPCO.1(7) states that conditions may 
also be placed on the use of the information and Art. LAW.OPCO.1(8) ensures that 
onward transfer of information is only permitted if the framework under which the in-
formation was obtained provides for such transfer. The information may be provided 
via any communication channel including the secure communication line for the pur-
poses of provision of information through Europol. Art LAW.OPCO.1(10) states the 
provisions do not affect the operation or conclusion of bilateral agreements between 
the UK and Member States, provided such agreements are in compliance with Union 
law.  
Preliminary Analysis 
Although there is provision for the sharing of operational information, the UK has lost 
access to SIS II30 and the Europol Information System (EIS). SIS II provides important 
real time information relating to wanted or missing persons or objects and was con-
sulted 571 million times by UK police forces in 2019.31 Importantly, SIS II is used to 
                                                          
28 Art LAW.OPCO.1(1). 
29 See Keith and Grange, in this issue. 
30 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of 12 June 2007 on the establishment, operation and use of the 
second-generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) [2007] OJ L 205/63 (Council Decision 
2007/533/JHA). 
31 See written evidence submitted by the National Crime Agency to the Home Affairs Committee 
<https://committees.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/19454/pdf/> accessed 24 January 2021. 
circulate alerts for individuals wanted for arrest32 and missing persons.33 The UK will 
now circulate this information via Interpol or through bilateral channels with Member 
States.34   
The impact of losing SIS II will depend on the extent to which Member States also 
choose to dually circulate information through Interpol as well as through SIS II. Mem-
ber States may wish to use bilateral mechanisms for exchange and the provisions 
allow for new bilateral agreements to be made as needed to facilitate data exchange, 
as long as these agreements are in accordance with Union law.  
Title V – Europol 
Applicable Law 
Art LAW.EUROPOL.46-61 details the future cooperative relations between Europol 
and the competent authorities of the UK. The stated aim of the provisions is ‘to support 
and strengthen the action and cooperation by the Member States and the UK […] in 
preventing and combating serious crime, terrorism and forms of crime which affect a 
common interest covered by a Union policy’.35 The scope of substantive cooperation, 
in the sense of the forms of crimes within the TCA’s and Europol’s competence, is the 
same as previously. The list of forms of crimes in Annex LAW-3 matches the list within 
Annex 1 of the Europol Regulation. According to Art LAW.EUROPOL.48(3), changes 
to the forms of crimes within the Europol Regulation can be replicated under the TCA 
through an amendment to Annex LAW-3. The scope of operational cooperation is cov-
ered by Art LAW.EUROPOL.49 and ‘may, in addition to the exchange of personal data 
[…] in particular include: (a) the exchange of information such as specialist knowledge; 
(b) general situation reports; (c) results of strategic analysis; (d) information on criminal 
investigation procedures; (e) information on crime prevention methods; (f) participation 
in training activities; and (g) the provision of advice and support in individual criminal 
investigations as well as operational cooperation’.  
On an operational level, Art LAW.EUROPOL.50 provides that the UK ‘shall designate 
a single contact point to act as the central contact point with Europol’36 which also 
serves as ‘central point of contact in respect of review, correction and deletion of per-
sonal data’.37 In addition, the UK ‘shall second one or more liaison officers to Europol. 
Europol may second one or more liaison officers to the UK’38. According to Art 
                                                          
32 Pursuant to Art 26 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
33 Pursuant to Art 32 Council Decision 2007/533/JHA. 
34 See European Commission, ‘Questions and Answers: EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement’ 
(Brussels, 24 December 2020), answer to ‘Will the UK keep access to the Schengen Information 
System (SIS)?’ <https://e00-
expansion.uecdn.es/opinion/documentosWeb/2020/12/26/Pregun-
tas%20y%20respuestas%20Brexit.pdf> accessed 24 January 2021. 
35 As per Art LAW.EUROPOL.46. 
36 Art LAW.EUROPOL.50(1). 
37 Art LAW.EUROPOL.50(3).  
38 Art LAW.EUROPOL.50(4). 
LAW.EUROPOL.50(6) ’the number of liaison officers, the details of their tasks, their 
rights and obligations and the costs’ will be set out in working and administrative ar-
rangements to be concluded between Europol and the UK.39  
Art LAW.EUROPOL.49(1) makes clear that the exchange of personal data is a core 
element of the future cooperation between the UK and Europol. It shall take ’as quickly 
as possible’ which might require ‘the incorporation of […] new processes and technical 
developments’.40 In terms of data protection, Title V contains special provisions on 
inter alia restrictions of access to and use of transferred data41, the observance of 
human rights42, the reliability and accuracy of information, the security of its exchange 
and liability for unauthorized or incorrect processing43. Finally, Art LAW.EUROPOL.59 
provides for the imposition of provisions complementing or implementing the working 
and administrative arrangements between the UK and Europol. Those arrangements 
are to be subject to Art 23(4) and 25(1) Europol Regulation44, and shall allow for con-
sultations, participation as observers in each other’s meetings, association in order to 
conduct operational analysis projects, the specification of liaison officers and their 
tasks and duties, and cooperation in the event of privacy or security breaches.  
Preliminary Analysis 
The single most significant effect of Brexit as regards Europol is simply that the UK 
has lost its status as a member. The UK as non-EU Member State will no longer take 
part in institutional decision making and management and thus will not play an active 
role in administration and operation of Europol in future. Title V reflects, and to some 
extent compensates, this material change in status. The TCA lays the foundation for 
– as the European Commission has put it – ‘effective cooperation between the United 
Kingdom and Europol and Eurojust, in line with the rules for third countries established 
in EU legislation. This will help ensure robust capabilities in tackling serious cross-
                                                          
39 Art LAW.EUROPOL.50(6). 
40 As per Art LAW.EUROPOL.54. 
41 Art LAW.EUROPOL.52. 
42 Art LAW.EUROPOL.51(4). 
43 Art LAW.EUROPOL.55-57. 
44 See Footnote 7 with Art 23(4) and Art 25(1) according to which Europol has the power to conclude 
working arrangements with entities, while such working agreements shall not allow the exchange of 
personal data and shall not bind the Union or its Member States (Art 23 Europol Agreement). How-
ever, Europol may transfer personal data to an authority of a third country, insofar as such transfer 
is necessary for the performance of Europol’s tasks, on the basis of : (a)  a decision of the Commis-
sion adopted in accordance with Article 36 of Directive (EU) 2016/680, finding that the third country 
or a territory or a processing sector within that third country or the international organisation in 
question ensures an adequate level of protection (‘adequacy decision’); (b)  an international agree-
ment concluded between the Union and that third country or international organisation pursuant to 
Article 218 TFEU adducing adequate safeguards with respect to the protection of privacy and funda-
mental rights and freedoms of individuals; or (c)  a cooperation agreement allowing for the exchange 
of personal data concluded, before 1 May 2017, between Europol and that third country or interna-
tional organisation in accordance with Article 23 of Decision 2009/371/JHA (Art. 25 Europol Agree-
ment). 
border crime’.45 Particularly notable elements of the new cooperation scheme are the 
secondment of one or more Liaison Officers46, the establishment of a central point of 
contact on the UK side and provision for the comprehensive and timely exchange of 
data. Fortunately, the TCA also provides for strict data protection management. More-
over, the UK can continue to take part in common operations, joint investigation teams 
and analysis projects as well as receive analytical support from Europol and use com-
mon secure communications channels. In these regards Title V appears to give the 
UK access to almost all of the Europol resources which, as a matter of principle, are 
usually restricted to EU Member States.  
Under the TCA the full extent of the UK’s future cooperation with Europol is unclear 
and remains to be detailed in the working and administrative arrangements. They will 
be negotiated between the UK and Europol; the EU Member States are not involved 
in this process. This brings a risk that the new rules may lead to existing data exchange 
and information systems in the EU being affected through the addition of a specific 
UK-related system. Competent agencies (police, prosecution) might experience diffi-
culties ascertaining whom to ask for what according to which rule. This multiplicity of 
rules may in turn affect data protection. Overall, the terms of Title V may be seen to 
be a ‘jack of all trades device’.47 They set out very strict data protection and manage-
ment terms and rely on human rights law – which is very positive – yet at the same 
time they facilitate future cooperation between UK and Europol including broad access 
to the Europol resources previously limited to EU Member States. Europol is working 
with the Commission on a new legislative proposal which would enable Europol to 
directly exchange personal data with private parties and strengthen cooperation with 
third countries.48 The extent to which this widening of Europol’s mandate may facilitate 
the UK’s access to EU data systems will have to be closely monitored. 
Title IX – Exchange of Criminal Record Information 
Applicable Law 
Art LAW.EXINF.120-126 govern the exchange of criminal record information. Particu-
larly relevant are Art LAW.EXINF.120, 123 and 125. Art LAW.EXINF.120(1) iterates 
                                                          
45 European Commission, ‘EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement A new relationship, with big 
changes’ (Brussels, December 2020) <https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/info/sites/info/files/brexit_files/info_site/6_pager_final.pdf> accessed 24 January 2021. 
46 In comparison, according to Art 8 of the Europol Regulation (footnote 7) Member States designate 
at least one liaison officer. However, Chapter V Art 23-27 Europol Regulation does not provide for 
the designation of liaison officers with third parties. Nevertheless, as for the moment more than 
twelve non-EU Member States designate liaison officers to Europol, among them Australia, Albania, 
Canada, Columbia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey. From the U.S. Europol hosts liaison officers 
from 11 different US agencies, all communicating through the SIENA system, see: 
<https://www.europol.europa.eu/partners-agreements> accessed 24 January 2021. The TCA and 
follow-up administrative agreements will make sure that the UK will be in line with liaisons and 
strategic exchanges.  
47 German ‘eierlegende Wollmilchsau’. 
48 Council conclusions on Europol’s cooperation with Private Parties 2 December (2019) 14745/19. 
the objective of Title IX, as ‘… to enable the exchange between the Member States on 
the one side, and the United Kingdom, on the other side, of information extracted from 
the criminal record’. Art LAW.EXINF.123(2) provides that the ‘central authority of each 
State shall inform the central authority of any other State of all criminal convictions 
handed down within its territory in respect of nationals of the latter State’. Finally, Art 
LAW.EXINF.125(1) inter alia states that if ‘information from the criminal record of a 
State is requested at domestic level […] the central authority of that State may […] 
submit a request to the central authority of another State for information and related 
data to be extracted from the criminal record’. 
These provisions correspond by and large to FD ECRIS49 and ECRIS50 according to 
which criminal record information is concentrated, stored and updated in the State of 
the convicted person’s nationality. That information is exchanged on request with the 
designated central authorities of other Member States for purposes of criminal pro-
ceedings or any other purposes. The rules governing these features of the system in 
EU law, Art. 3, 5, 6, and 7 FD ECRIS, are mirrored in Art LAW.EXINF.122, 124, 125 
and 126. Accordingly, Part III, Title IX ensures that the UK stays part of this system 
with only minor changes. They concern the scope of information exchanged, time 
lines, and the channels of communication. As to the scope of information Art 
LAW.EXINF.123(1) refers to ‘information on the nationality […] of the convicted person 
if that person is a national of another State’. ’State’ in this context is defined as ‘Mem-
ber State or the United Kingdom’51, the latter will arguably no longer take part in the 
exchange of information on convictions of third-country nationals. In regard to time 
periods for communication the TCA provides for more lenient timelines than FD 
ECRIS. It states that information about a conviction must be communicated to the 
State of the convicted person’s nationality once a month52 and not ‘as soon as possi-
ble’53. Similarly, requests for the purposes of criminal proceedings must be acted upon 
within 2054, not 1055 working days. Finally, as a result of Brexit the UK loses access to 
ECRIS itself - a decentralised, encrypted network serving as a common communica-
tion infrastructure for the efficient exchange of criminal records data.56 EU Member 
                                                          
49 Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA of 26 February 2009 on the organisation and content 
of the exchange of information extracted from the criminal record between Member States [2009] 
OJ L 93/23 (FD ECRIS), as amended by European Parliament and Council Directive (EU) 2019/884 
of 17 April 2019 amending Council Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA, as regards the exchange of 
information on third-country nationals and as regards the European Criminal Records Information 
System (ECRIS), and replacing Council Decision 2009/316/JHA [2019] OJ L 151/143 (Directive (EU) 
2019/884). 
50 Council Decision 2009/316/JHA of 6 April 2009 on the establishment of the European Criminal 
Records Information Systems (ECRIS) in application of Art 11 Framework Decision 2009/315/JHA 
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51 Art COMPROV.17(1)(e). 
52 According to Art LAW.EXINF.123(2). 
53 Art 4(2) FD ECRIS. 
54 Art LAW.EXINF.126(1). 
55 Art 8(1) FD ECRIS. 
56 Art 11a FD ECRIS. 
States will continue to use ECRIS in cooperation with the UK, which in turn must de-




The UK – which has made frequent use of ECRIS in the past58 – and the Member 
States will continue to (more or less) automatically exchange information on criminal 
records59. This is to be welcomed. Knowledge of whether an individual, a convicted 
person or otherwise, has a criminal record or not is important for sentencing and other 
purposes. Under the TCA the UK appears to lose access to information on the criminal 
records of third-country nationals. This could have a significant impact upon the fight 
against transnational crime and terrorism.60 On the other hand, information on criminal 
records is typically detrimental to convicted persons and accordingly a fair sentencing 
process may also require a transnational exchange of exonerating information. Re-
lated to this, the TCA, in line with the ECRIS system, guarantees that all participating 
States are informed of the national deletion of information contained in criminal rec-




Throughout the negotiations those at the front line of transnational policing have been 
clear that fast and effective means of sharing information and intelligence enhances 
public safety and saves lives. The TCA could never replicate the level of cooperation 
the UK enjoyed in the area of police and judicial cooperation within the EU because 
the UK was no longer a Member State, wanted no role for the CJEU and had ended 
free movement. In that regard the new arrangements inevitably represent a ‘security 
downgrade’ in relation to information exchange. However, that does not mean that it 
is a bad deal. The UK and the EU have secured cooperation that, in many regards, is 
as close as was conceivable, without crossing any of the UK’s red lines or undermining 
the EU’s internal legal order. The provisions on access to PNR, DNA and fingerprints 
and criminal records have ensured arrangements very close to those provided be-
tween Member States. 
Although Titles II-IV and IX facilitate important aspects of information exchange, the 
loss of real-time data access will have an operational impact. Greater emphasis will 
                                                          
57 Art 3 ANNEX LAW-6; the Annex also contains standard forms for requests for and transmissions 
of criminal record information. 
58 Commission, ‘Report concerning the exchange through the European Criminal Information System 
(ECRIS) of information extracted from criminal records between the Member States’ COM (2017) 
341, 5, 9. 
59 On the national implementation of Part III, Title IX of the TCA in the UK see Part I of the European 
Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020. 
60 See Recitals 1-5 Directive 2019/884/EU. 
61 Art Law.EXINF.123(2). 
have to be placed on ’soft’ cooperation between the United Kingdom and Member 
States in the years to come in order to enhance efficient data exchange. This will be 
particularly important in ensuring that EU-UK arrest warrants – as opposed to the still 
necessary underlying domestic arrest warrants - are circulated efficiently.62 The ex-
change of red notices via Lyon (Interpol) remains unchanged. Title IV foresees the use 
of bilateral agreements to facilitate cooperation on operational information and the 
United Kingdom’s relationship with Europol will undoubtedly continue to be important.  
The continued efficient exchange of personal data as envisaged in Title III is depend-
ent on the long-standing commitment of both parties to the protection of personal 
data.63 The high level of data exchange between Member States has only been pos-
sible because of the harmonised approach to data protection over the last decade.64 
Van de Heyning notes that ‘clear rules on future cooperation between the UK and EU 
on data protection in the field of justice and security are necessary if both intend to 
ensure an efficient exchange of personal data by law enforcement and judicial author-
ities.’65 Although a short transition period of four to six months has been provided for, 
data transfer will only be possible if the EU agrees on an ‘adequacy decision’. If such 
a decision is not reached the efficacy of many aspects of Part III will be significantly 
undermined as the ‘systematic exchange of personal data in the field of criminal justice 
would therefore be excluded.’66 
Conclusion 
In the area of police cooperation and the exchange of information the TCA is more 
than what most interested persons could have hoped for. The ever-looming prospect 
of a no-deal Brexit gave rise to real and legitimate concerns on the continuation of the 
level and nature of criminal cooperation between the UK and the EU 27. This could 
have had considerable impact on the ability of criminal justice authorities in both to 
combat transnational and indeed domestic criminality. Fortunately, the TCA maintains 
a considerable proportion of the extant systems of cooperation as regards DNA and 
fingerprint data, vehicle registration information, passenger name records, operational 
information, Europol and criminal record information. As highlighted, however, there 
are differences in the arrangements. The loss of SIS II appears to be the most consid-
erable. Time will tell if this is indeed the case, or whether the importance of cooperation 
to criminal justice authorities in the UK and the EU 27 will lead to enhanced usage of 
Interpol or separate bilateral arrangements. Another notable feature of the TCA in the 
area of police cooperation is the Prum-related evaluation of the UK’s systems facilitat-
ing the exchange of DNA data etcetera. The EU will have to continually assess the 
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sufficiency of the UK’s systems of recording and sharing data relevant to criminal in-
vestigations. The UK will also have to ensure close adherence to EU data protection 
standards without having any control over how those standards develop. This high-
lights the point that “… whilst the UK might recoup formal sovereignty via Brexit, its de 
facto autonomy continues to be curtailed by external influences”.67    
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